How does the time buer (slack) in an operating system aect its performance, and why?
Introduction
Managing many operating systems involves building schedules (plans) that outline the time available to complete a sequence of operational 1 tasks along with the associated deadline for completion of the task. For instance, in knowledge-intensive domains such as project management, start time of an activity is planned depending on when the preceding activity completes and based on the deadline (for instance, see Kelley and Walker 1959, Berman 1964) . Similarly, in made-to-order manufacturing, rms plan their production schedule based on the delivery date and when the inputs (raw materials) become available (Rajagopalan 2002) .
In all such operating systems, the scheduled time buer -which we dene as the time from the planned start of the activity to the time of deadline -is only a tentative projection. The actual start time depends on several variables, and even with a plan that requires starting an activity at a specic given time, the actual start time is often subject to many uncertainties such as late completion of preceding activities. Hence, the available time buer or the actual time buer -which we dene as the time from the actual start time of the activity to the time of deadline -might be very dierent from the scheduled time buer. This article is concerned with understanding how the time buers (scheduled and actual) inuence the performance of general operating systems.
We motivate our study with a specic example from the service-oriented airline industry:
Airlines develop detailed plans which lay out when a specic aircraft is scheduled to arrive at and depart from an airport. This plan determines the scheduled time buer, the planned time (scheduled ground-time) that the airlines have available to conduct all the activities such as deplane arriving passengers, cleaning and refueling the craft, and boarding new passengers.
But the uncertain actual arrival time of the aircraft on the day of operation implies that the actual time buer (actual ground-time) available might be dierent from the scheduled time buer. This might aect operating performance measured through missed deadlines 1 We use the terms operational and operating interchangeably throughout the paper. Using the publicly available data from Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) website 2 , we constructed the scatter plots in Figure 1 , that show the tted lines for ight departure delays as a function of actual time buer (left) and scheduled time buer (right).
The eect of the actual time buer on operating performance is intuitive and merits limited discussion. Specically, one should expect that when the actual time available is lower (higher), the operating performance is likely to be poorer (better). However, the eect of the scheduled time buer, as can be seen in the right panel of Figure 1 , is more subtle.
Indeed, while one may anticipate that the scheduled time buer (after accounting for actual ground-time) should not aect operating performance, the gure in fact shows clear evidence that the departure delay is greater when scheduled time buer is larger! Parkinson's law and theories of procrastination oer one obvious behavioral approach to understand the unusual relationship between scheduled time buers and operating performance. Specically, such theories (perhaps in a half-serious vein) argue that work expands to ll the available time, and thus suggest that scheduling larger time buers may not just fail to improve operating performance, but may in fact reduce it (for instance, see Schonberger 1981 , Gutierrez and Kouvelis 1991a , Rand 2000 , Goldratt 1997 ). While the behavioral Parkinson's law might be one of the reasons, we propose an alternate formal operational model that has a key implication that once we account for operational exibility, the exact same relationship between scheduled buers and operating performance will appear by virtue of rm attempting to minimize operating costs. Thus, our formal model and its results demonstrate that what might appear to be a behavioral phenomenon can just as easily emerge as the outcome from a prot maximizing (or cost minimizing) rm's rational decision-making.
Still, given that the evidence of the relationship between scheduled buers and operating performance does not allow us to discriminate between our rational operational model and other behavioral models of procrastination (such as Parkinson's law), we also explore additional implications of our model and oer a set of theoretical propositions about how the time buers (actual and scheduled) interact with other operational variables in determining operating performance. Specically, only our model predicts that exibility of an operating system moderates the degree to which time buers inuence operating performance, and that with greater exibility the eect of both scheduled and actual time buer is smaller.
These predictions are then tested with the airline data to compare the empirical content of our model (versus theories of procrastination). Our results bear out the key theoretical predictions of our model, and thus demonstrate that what seems to be a conventional case of Parkinson's law might in fact be the optimal behavior of an operating system. Moreover, the specic empirical results we nd -the impact of buers on performance depends on the operational exibility -highlights the importance of understanding the extent of operational exibility when ex-ante allocating buers.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In §2, we give a selective review the vast literature on planning in operating systems and time buer management. Next, an analytical model of operational exibility and time buers is oered in §3, and its implications are elucidated. §4 oers an empirical test of our key predictions. Finally, §5 oers a discussion of the practical signicance of our ndings, both for the case of general operating systems and for the specic case of the domestic airline industry, and concludes with some suggestions for future research. All proofs are provided in Appendix A and supplementary results are in Appendix B.
Literature Review
Our work broadly is related to three areas: (i) studies in project management (planning), and Parkinson's law and procrastination, and (ii) the large body of literature related to exibility in operational systems, and (iii) research in airline industry that examines ight delays and its causes.
In project management, planners routinely include safety buers above and beyond the actual time needed to complete the task so as to improve the probability of completing a task on time. However, this may result in two critical issues. First, adding such buers could result in beginning the task as late as possible (the student syndrome or procrastination), or second, even increasing the amount and complexity of the task itself. Consequently, the addition of safety buer may not serve its intended purpose, and the task may get delayed nevertheless. As discussed in Goldratt (1997) , delays in a specic task's completion are passed on to the entire project whereas benets from a task nishing early are rarely passed on. Goldratt (1997) proposes the critical chain method to address some of these problems.
The impact of introducing time buers has also received attention in the literature related to Parkinson's law (Gutierrez and Kouvelis 1991b) , and more generally, theories of procrastination, i.e., behavioral approaches to understanding how planned safety time (buers) relate to performance. Specically, such theories claim that work expands to ll the available buer time, and thus suggest that scheduling larger time buers may not achieve their intended result of reducing operational delays (Schonberger 1981 , Gutierrez and Kouvelis 1991a , Rand 2000 , Goldratt 1997 . In similar vein, other studies consider time-inconsistent preferences to demonstrate that people will often put o work for later (Akerlof 1991 , Laibson 1997 , O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999 , 2001 , and in some cases till the task deadline is too close resulting in task abandonment. From the psychology side, researchers have looked at slack and its eect on procrastination and found that slack (or lack of constraints) can inuence the extent of procrastination (Shu and Gneezy 2010) . Indeed, Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) argue that this very behavioral trait might result in people being willing to self-impose meaningful deadlines to overcome procrastination and hence reduce delays. Zauberman and Lynch Jr (2005) make the argument that potential for future slack results in people deferring more work, and that this can lead to procrastination (and delays) when tasks have a greater slack.
Our paper is also related to the extensive work in operations management that examines the value of operational exibility. Jordan and Graves (1995) is one of the seminal papers that demonstrates the value of exibility in an operating system. Building on this paper, Graves and Tomlin (2003) demonstrates how to analyze the benets of process exibility in multiproduct supply chains facing uncertain demand. Van Mieghem (1998) considers the question of investing in exible resources as a function of costs, prices, and demand uncertainty across two products. Van Mieghem (1998) argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, investing in exible resources is advantageous even when demand is perfectly positively correlated across the two products. In this paper we use a notion of resource exibility similar to that in Van Mieghem (1998) , and also model our cost function similarly. One of the important contributions of our paper is that we empirically demonstrate that impact of constraints (like start time and deadlines) on operational performance depends on the exibility, and consequently the choice of buer availability needs to be guided by an understanding of the amount of exibility in the system. Lastly, since we use data from the airline industry to build and test our empirical models, our study also oers insights into delay propagation in (airline) networks and its impact on operational performance. Several papers in this area (Mayer and Sinai 2003 , Deshpande and Arikan 2012 , Arikan et al. 2013 ) have developed models of ight delays and its antecedents.
Indeed, the importance of managing delays requires airlines to routinely perturb their schedules to improve operational performance by adjusting their ight block-times and groundtimes (Sohoni et al. 2011 , Arikan et al. 2013 ). Our results, in addition to being statistically signicant, show that an economically signicant part of ight delays is explained purely by scheduling decisions and more specically scheduled time buers (which have not been previously considered in past literature). Thus, our results highlight the role of operational exibility while scheduling and managing the ground-time slack in this industry.
Model Setup and Results
In this section we develop a stylized model that captures the key variable of operational exibility to examine the impact of scheduled and actual time buers on operating performance.
Suppose that the following sequence of planning events occur at the focal rm. First, the rm determines and publishes its schedule, which comprises the scheduled start time and the deadline for a given activity. Let T denote the scheduled time buer, i.e., the time from scheduled start time to the deadline. For modeling purposes we assume that the activity can be completed in K time units with minimal cost, i.e., the K represents the base-line time required to complete the activity.
Given the uncertainty associated with the operating system under consideration, we shall assume that the actual (available) time buer, represented by t, may be dierent from T .
We assume that the actual buer time, t, is random and is distributed as T + t 0 , where t 0 is a random variable. Once the scheduled times are published, and T and the distribution of t are known, the planner may ex-ante (i.e. during the planning stages) choose to reduce the base time K by δ 1 time units so as to complete the tasks in K − δ 1 time units. For example, the planner can do so by ex-ante allocating additional resources. Similar to Van Mieghem (1998) we assume that the cost of reducing completion time (allocating additional planned resources) is linear in δ 1 , i.e., c · δ 1 . Subsequently, during real-time operations, once t is realized, the planner may have an additional opportunity to deploy additional resources and reduce the completion time by an additional δ 2 time units. Let the cost of this real-time reduction in activity time be given by c · (1 + θ) · δ 2 . In this model, we interpret the θ parameter in terms of the amount of exibility of the operating system, where a high θ corresponds to a larger cost, i.e, lower exibility. Thus, the service can complete in time K − δ 1 − δ 2 for a given t. This implies, that for a given t the delay is given by We assume that delay is costly only when it is positive (i.e., nishing the service before the deadline oers no benets). That is, we normalize the delay cost to max {d, 0}. In this setup the goal of the focal rm is to minimize the total costs; i.e., the sum of ex-ante costs cδ 1 and ex-post costs c (1 + θ) δ 2 and the delay costs max {d, 0}. This optimization problem may be solved as follows.
In the second stage, after the actual time buer t has been realized, the rm chooses δ 2 according to the following minimization problem:
We summarize the optimal values of δ 2 and d in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. The optimal solution to (1)- (2) is given by
and the corresponding delay d is given by K − δ 1 − δ 2 − t.
The proof of Lemma 1 is straightforward. Hence, for brevity, we skip the details. Lemma 1 helps us roll back the second stage ex-post decision and to analyze the ex-ante expected total cost, T C.
First, consider the case when c(1 + θ) < 1. In this case
Hence, the expected total cost, E[T C], is given by
Second, consider the case when c(1 + θ) ≥ 1. In this case
Note that in either case, the the rm's ex-ante optimization problem that allocates the ex-ante resources δ 1 is given by
s.t.
To characterize the optimal solution to (8) we rst show that that
The proofs of all theorems are given in Appendix A.
Notice that, using Theorem 1, it is easy to verify that the second term in ( (7) and (5)), i.e., the expected total cost, is also supermodular in (δ 1 , T ). An immediate implication of Theorem 1 is that the optimal, ex-ante, time reduction δ 1 (T ) is decreasing in T . We summarize this result in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. As a solution to (1) the optimal delay d is decreasing in t and increasing in T . 
and Notice that, in equations (10) and (11),
We illustrate this in Figure 2 where c = 1, Thus, our model, albeit stylized, demonstrates that the optimal delay is a decreasing function of actual time buer, and more interestingly that the optimal delay is an increasing function of scheduled time buer.
Empirical Validation and Robustness Tests
Our model of operational exibility and delays, while parsimonious, is consistent with the actual empirical data (shown in Figure 1 ) that motivated this study. Still, it is to be noted that this (operational) model is not the only way to explain away the unusual positive correlation between scheduled slack and delays. Specically, a more behavioral model of (time-inconsistent preferences and) procrastination also appears to be consistent with Figure   1 . However, our formal model also allows us to go beyond the rst order direct eects and predicts an interaction between operational exibility and scheduled/actual slack; a prediction that is unique to our model. The focus of this section is to oer an empirical examination of the predictive power of our model in explaining delays in operating systems versus alternate plausible explanations.
As noted earlier, while our model is meant to capture general operating systems where planned and actual slacks might dier, for the empirical test we focus on the airline industry in the US for two reasons: First, Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) requires and collects data on almost every commercial airline's operating schedule and actual arrival/departure time, which gives us access to an industry-wide large data set without having to concern ourselves with poor quality data or any selection bias. Airlines track and report ve segments of the travel time for each of their ights to the FAA: (i) departure delay, (ii) taxi-out, (iii) air-time, (iv) taxi-in, and (v) arrival delay. This information is publicly available through the BTS website. Our sample is almost the entire population of civilian domestic ights operated by airlines in the US that account for at least 1% of the total domestic scheduled service passenger revenues 3 . Second, in the airline industry, the actual task that we shall empirically examine, namely servicing and getting the aircraft ready for it's next ight, is a more or less standardized task. This feature allows us to focus on the slacks and uncertainty 3 https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/28632. Last accessed: December 22, 2014. inherent in operationalizing the plans and their eect on departure delays of ights.
We begin by describing the key elements of the operating system in this industry that are relevant to our study (interested readers may refer to some examples in Holloran and Byrn 1986, Chu 2007 for some additional details). First, the airline determines and publishes its schedule. This schedule also species which particular aircraft, identied by their tail numbers, operate which specic ights in the network. The sequence of ights operated by a particular tail number is dened as the aircraft rotation (Barnhart and Cohn 2004) . Figure 4 shows a sequence of inbound and outbound ights, within an aircraft rotation, at a particular station in an airline's network. The schedule also implicitly species the scheduled groundtime buer (T ), i.e. the scheduled time gap between the arrival and departure of consecutive ights in a rotation. There are several activities that must be completed during the scheduled (actual) buer time to get the aircraft ready for departure on its next (outbound) ight. Some of these activities include de-boarding passengers, cleaning, catering, fueling, and other such activities some that can be done simultaneously and others that must be done sequentially. Now, depending on scheduled ground-time and resource availability, the operating manager at the airport decides on how to allocate resources to complete all these tasks on time, i.e., without delaying scheduled departures.
While the planned aircraft rotation lays out the scheduled time buer, and deadlines, the actual arrival time of the aircraft, on the day of operation, is uncertain (Arikan et al. 2013 ). Thus, the actual ground-time available to complete the tasks could be dierent from the scheduled ground-time. The operating manager has the additional ex-post ability to increase the resources and or prioritize particular tasks so as to minimize delays.
We use data from BTS website for all daily, domestic, ights own in the US from January 2009 through December 2013. The full data set contains 31.5 million records of ights. While these records have data on the departure delay, to test our key interaction hypothesis, we also need a measure for exibility. While operating exibility can depend on number of dierent variables, for the purposes of this empirical test, we shall primarily focus on a measure of utilization. We computed hourly ight arrivals and departures at an airport, for every airline, to estimate hourly utilization as a fraction of the maximum hourly arrivals and departures during the day. That is, we create the Utilization variable as Utilization (for an airline at an airport for a given day at a specic hour) Finally, past research indicates that overall airport congestion has a signicant eect on each airlines operating performance (Rosenberger et al. 2002 , Lapré and Scudder 2004 , Deshpande and Arikan 2012 , Arikan et al. 2013 ). The hourly airport congestion was computed using the total number of ights, across all airlines, operating from the airport and the maximum airport arrival and departure capacity 5 . This congestion variable is, in addition to its theoretical importance, is necessary for us since our exibility variable is likely to be correlated to utilization, and thus makes interpreting our results dicult. Hence, we shall explicitly control for congestion in our empirical tests and verify that our exibility variable has additional predictive power above and beyond what is already explained by congestion.
Next, after creating the exibility and congestion variables, out of of full data set of 31.5 4 Note that most models of operating systems, including for instance queuing models, predict that higher utilization of available capacity makes any marginal increase in utilization more costly. Consistent with these models, exibility in our analytical model (the θ parameter) captures the marginal cost in exerting eort, and thus greater utilization (which by denition) decreases our exibility variable has the eect of increasing the cost in our stylized model. 5 Data for each ASPM (Aviation System Performance Metrics) airport is available on FAA's Operations and Performance data website http://aspm.faa.gov. For non-ASPM airports the capacity was estimated using the maximum number of hourly ights in a given month (last accessed in January, 2014). million, 0.5 million (1.5%) were removed either because of missing tail numbers, or because they were canceled ights. Next, using this data we built aircraft rotations 6 for each aircraft, and computed actual slack available for each ight in the rotation, t, as the dierence between the scheduled departure time of the ight and the actual arrival time of the previous ight in the rotation (similar to Arikan et al. 2013) . Similarly, the scheduled ground-time, T , for each ight was computed as the dierence between the scheduled departure of ight and the scheduled arrival of the preceding ight in the rotation.
We removed records with missing scheduled or actual block times, or ights that were diverted (reducing the number of ights to 30.88 million). In addition, since we do not want outliers to inuence our estimates, we also trimmed the data dropping the top and bottom 5% of departure delay, scheduled and actual time slack 7 . This resulted in 8.6 million less records (28%) 8 . This nal cleaned data has 22.2 million observations, operated by 20 unique airlines from 332 distinct airports. Descriptive statistics of the data are given in Table 1 Next, we dropped all ights which had a greater than 150 minutes of slack (actual or scheduled) or less than 20 minutes of slack (actual or scheduled). These cutos, while somewhat arbitrary, allow us to focus was on understanding how the (scheduled and actual) slack aect delays in those interesting (and possibly more generalizable) cases where the slack is neither too small nor too large 9 . This nal data that we employ in our empirical 6 An aircraft rotation is a sequence of ights own by a specic aircraft. 7 These variables showed some extreme outliers. For instance, the maximum departure delay in the BTS data was 2445 minutes (40 hours)! Since this is likely the result of data error, we chose to be conservative and use only the trimmed data.
8 Robustness checks which eliminated fewer (1%) yields similar results. 9 Moreover, 20 minutes of ground-time is the industry standard for minimum slack, and the small number test has 15.4 million ights, by 20 carriers, operating out of 327 airports.
Our theoretical model makes two key predictions: (i) direct eect of t and T : the delay decreases in actual time slack t and increases in scheduled time slack T , and (ii) interaction of exibility and t, and of exibility and T : delay is less aected by t when exibility is high, and delay is less aected by T when exibility is high (i.e., the interaction term for t and exibility has a positive coecient, and the interaction term for T and exibility has a negative coecient). Our empirical model, given below, controls for airline, airport, and time xed eects and examines how the departure delay of each ight is aected by the actual and scheduled time slacks (t and T ) and their interaction with exibility. Table 2 presents the results of our regression. As may be observed, Model 1.1 demonstrates that the eect of t and T that motivated the study is remarkably robust and is highly signicant. Specically, a 1 minute decrease in the actual slack increases the departure delay by 0.23 minute; whereas a 1 minute decrease in scheduled slack decreases the departure delay by 0.20 minutes. More interestingly, as Table 2 demonstrates, when we compare between Model 1.0 (which only includes controls that have been found in past literature to have a signicant inuence) and Model 1.1 (which in addition also includes actual and scheduled time slack), the R 2 goes from 4.8% to 14.5%. Note that this 200% increase in explained variance comes from just two of the operational time slack variables that we have included.
Thus, it appears that the eect of actual and scheduled slacks are not merely statistically signicant, but are signicant from a practical perspective and crucial in determining the of ights with less than this minimum value are possibly due to errors in data entry. In addition, the upper cut o allows us to avoid biasing our results. Specically, many of the ights with excessive ground time are at the beginning of the rotation. Hence, we cannot infer from the data the scheduled/slack slack since even with a scheduled ground time of say 5 hours, it is unlikely that an airline would plan the start of the servicing activity this early. Still, we did conduct robustness checks by choosing a dierent threshold -10 ≤ t ≤ 200 and 10 ≤ T ≤ 200 -and found identical results. Table 2 : Regression results. ‡ p < 0.0001; † p < 0.001
Results shown in model 1.2 (shown in Table 2 ) are consistent with our full set of predictions -namely, the coecient for the interaction of exibility and actual time slack is negative and the coecient for the interaction of exibility and scheduled time slack is positive. Thus, delays decrease in actual time slack t, but at a smaller rate when exibility is high; and delays increase in scheduled time slack T , but at smaller rate when exibility is high. These interaction results allow us to rule out the simpler behavioral (irrational) explanations of why time slack has an eect on delays and oer evidence for the empirical content of our model of operational exibility 10 .
While the key results in Table 2 are consistent with our theoretical model, the empirical measure of exibility that we employed might conceivably bias our results. For instance, the exibility measure being a ratio, might be prone to error if the denominator (i.e., maximum number of ights per hour operated from the given airport an airline is a small number (since in such a situation, the exibility measure possibly fails to take too many values 10 This is not to claim that more complex behavioral explanations can be ruled out. For instance, a model of procrastination where deferring work is also related to exibility would be consistent with the results. Still, in our empirical model, the exibility is the actual exibility, and not anticipated exibility. Thus, it appears that such a model of procrastination would also need agents whose beliefs about future exibility need to correlated to true realized exibility. While this is possible, we believe that our model of operational exibility and optimal resource allocation oers a signicantly simpler and consistent theory for our empirical results. between 0 and 100%). To ensure robustness, we took a two-pronged approach. First, we re-estimated the regression equation after dropping all ights where the maximum obtained was too low (< 5) for us to reliably estimate the exibility measure. Estimates, which are shown in Table 3 of the ancillary appendix, demonstrate clearly that our key results remain unchanged. Second, instead of using a ratio to measure exibility, we dened an alternate measure of exibility -namely, capacity slack -dened as 
Estimates of the eect of scheduled and actual time slack when exibility is measured using the above denition are summarized in Table 4 of the ancillary appendix. Our results are robust and are fully consistent with theoretical model.
Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The current study was motivated by the fundamental issue of understanding how buers in an operating system aect its performance. While the study of buers in a variety of contexts and its optimal management has occupied a signicant part of operations management research, there appears to be not much (empirical or theoretical) research that has examined our research question. Moreover, even in the research that has attempted to understand the impact of buers on performance, behavioral theories and Parkinson's law feature prominently. For instance, the conventional wisdom in project management relies on the so-called student syndrome and theories of procrastination to argue that scheduling larger time buer does not improve and may in fact decrease operating performance (see for example, Gutierrez and Kouvelis 1991b).
Our main contribution in this article is two fold: (i) We oer a simple and highly stylized model of how operational exibility interacts with time buers to determine operating per-formance. The model is subsequently shown to imply the very same empirical patterns as implied by the behavioral theories of time buers. Thus, our rational model oers a plausible alternative to the conventional behavioral theories that have been typically employed in past literature.
(ii) We explicitly test our normative model against the conventional behavioral theories using data from airline industry, and we demonstrate that (at least in this context) the data is consistent with our rational model. Specically, we show theoretically that our model implies an interesting interaction between operational exibility and time-buers, and that the eect of time buers on operating performance depends on the operational exibility. This implication, as it is not predicted by behavioral theories, allow us to do a cleaner test and results consistent with with our model are obtained.
Our results, at a general level, highlight the importance in understanding exibility at the operational level, when choosing the optimal schedules. Specically, a planning approach that does not account for exibility at the operational level and tries to optimize some combination of cost/utilization and revenue/on-time-performance will end up creating schedules that are too costly and/or schedules that are poor in revenue/on-time-performance (since those who have exibility react dierently compared to those without). To improve outcome performance measure (such as on-time-performance), operating systems that lack exibility should be constrained more (by scheduling lower time-buers) whereas those that have signicant exibility should be constrained less. Thus, our results suggest that it is the relative weight that the rm places on the outcome and input (cost) measures, and the relative exibility of the dierent parts of the operating system that determines the optimal schedule (and time buers).
While our concern for the most part has been on developing a highly stylized model and testing it. it is still useful to note that for the specic case of airline industry that motivated our model and empirical tests, the current study oers at least two important implications.
Firstly, it has long been assumed that one of the key reasons for ight delays and lower operating performance is congestion at airports and the consequent negative externality (for example, see Rosenberger et al. 2002, Mayer and Sinai 2003) . While we nd that externalities imposed by congestion does play a role (Table 3) , a much larger role is played by an airline's own scheduling choices. Specically, Table 3 shows that, in our data, congestion going from 0 to 100 has a similar eect as a mere additional 5 minutes (increase) of actual slack or an additional 5 minutes (decrease) of scheduled slack! Moreover, the dramatic increase in R 2 (by over 200%) when actual and scheduled slacks are added demonstrate that the part of the variance explained by the actual operating schedules is much larger compared to congestion, airline, airport, and time taken together. Thus, for future research work that attempts to evaluate the role of congestion public policy or airline operations probably should account for an airline's own operational scheduling decisions.
Secondly, to the extent that on-time-performance is an important competitive dimension (as suggested by Deshpande and Arikan 2012), our results suggest that the dierences between airlines on their on-time-performance measures may not be coming about primarily because of their routes (specic airports they y into, or the specic airports they y out of ), or because of congestion, or because of their network structure; but that (a large part of ) the dierences in operating performance may be traced back to the operating schedules and more specically to the scheduled and actual time buers that have been allocated. Consequently, if the goal is to improve operating performance, the airlines might be better served by improvements in their planning (that accounts for operating exibility) compared to broader strategic changes (such as changes to routes, or adding capacity at specic airports, etc). While our theoretical model was developed with a general operating system in mind, our empirical focus in this article was on the context of ight delays and ground-time buers.
This empirical focus is mostly pragmatic (since the data are readily available). However, our ndings may be applicable to wider contexts and deserves more investigation. For instance, consider a manufacturing or a project management setting. A plan, in these cases, implicitly species the scheduled time buer for each activity and their completion deadlines, whereas the actual time buer available might change depending on the uncertainty associated with preceding activities or uncertain availability of crucial resources. Overall, our results suggest that to manage operational performance one needs to understand both the direct eect of time buers and the role of resource exibility in determining both the sign and magnitude of the eect of time buers.
A Main Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Proof. It is easy to verify that φ(λ) = E (λ − t 0 ) + , is a convex function in λ. To do so, let p(x) denote the probability density function of t 0 and P (x) denote the corresponding cumulative density function. Thus, Proof. The proof follows immediately by recalling that d = min {0, K − δ 1 (T ) − t} and Theorem 2.8.1 in Topkis (1998 Table 4 : Regression results (with Capacity Slack). ‡ p < 0.0001; † p < 0.001
It is noteworthy that the results in Table ( 3) hold even if we consider airlines who operate at least 5 ights from any given station. The sign of the coecient for slack is unexpectedly positive. However, note that the way we measure slack (see denition in equation 14) will be positively correlated with our measure of congestion (based on the ratio of number of ight to maximum for all airlines). Since the coecient on congestion is negative, to nd the net eect of slack, we need to do a regression without the congestion variable. This is shown in Table 5 : Regression results (with Capacity Slack) and with at least 5 ights/hour/airline. ‡ p < 0.0001; † p < 0.001
